Revelation and Reason: Understanding and Resolving the Dilemma
Introduction
Religions which are revived and presented by a Prophet or a Messenger of Allah, appear to argue in a rational (i.e. reasonable) manner. Indeed, such revived religions secure an edge for themselves by pointing out the irrational and unsubstantiated nature of beliefs and practices in the aged forms of religion that are prevalent in a society where the Prophet seeks to restore the original dīn al-qayyim.1 But following the death of Prophet, the refreshed religion again starts aging and in the process loses its rational character. Irrational elements creep in to the religious beliefs and practices, and finally Tertulian’s argument—I believe it because it is absurd—becomes a necessity for the devoutly religious. Consequently, as religion ages in the aging civilization, a higher place is sought for revelation than for reason in order to protect the irrational dogmas accruing in religious thought over the course of history; the originally complementary relationship between revelation and reason no longer remains the case.
The relationship between revelation and reason is one of the major epistemological issues faced by the Muslim world today. Muslim civilization has also experienced aging; as part of the aging process, the relationship between revelation and reason has become the subject of controversy. This short paper seeks to identify various positions held about the relationship between revelation and reason, and the issues that arise if one or the other of these positions is subscribed to. In the analysis of these positions, the background which led some people to advocate one or the other position will also be considered. It is hoped that the paper will allay the confusions of young Muslims regarding the relationship between revelation and reason.
Identifying the Positions and the Issues
When we discuss the relationship between revelation and reason, we seek to determine whether revelation is to be given a priority over reason, or reason is to be given a priority over revelation, or the two are equally valid and complementary. When any one of these positions is taken, some subsidiary questions arise. These subsidiary questions associated with the three possible positions will be identified in the following lines.
If revelation is given priority over reason, then the following questions have to be answered:
· Can we silence reason when it appears to contradict revelation?
· Is revelation rational? Or are there some irrational propositions in revelation, which cannot be protected unless a higher place is secured for revelation than for reason?
· Is priority of revelation over reason applicable under all circumstances? If not, then when exactly or in what sense is revelation given a priority over reason?
Next, if we give reason a priority over revelation, then the following questions have to be answered:
· Can reason validate or invalidate the commandments of revelation?
· Is an understanding of the rationale behind an injunction a precondition for compliance by a Muslim?
· Is priority of reason over revelation applicable under all circumstances? If not, then when exactly or in what sense is reason given a priority over revelation?
Finally, if one holds that revelation and reason are equally valid, then the following issues have to be addressed:
· If revelation and reason are considered equally valid, how would one resolve a conflict between the claims of revelation and reason should such a situation arise?
· Why would one want to hold that revelation and reason are equally valid?
An Evaluation of the Controversy
A review of the literature indicates that scholars have often taken one or the other of the aforementioned positions about the relationship between revelation and reason; the positions have been thought of as mutually exclusive. Furthermore, whichever position is adopted is held to be applicable under all circumstances and in every way. This, however, does not appear to be realistic.
In reality, each of the aforementioned positions is backed by compelling arguments, yet leaves some issues unaddressed, as we have seen in the preceding section. It may be argued that none of the positions is applicable under all circumstances and in every possible sense. Instead, each of the position is true in a particular way or under certain circumstances, but inapplicable in some other ways or under different circumstances.
The whole controversy about the relationship between revelation and reason can be understood and resolved if one apprehends the fact that different people have meant different things from the word “reason”, and have had different preoccupations that compelled them to take their respective positions. Not only that, but a failure to take into account the other considerations also led people to preclude the applicability of the positions other than their own. In the following paragraphs, with the help of a diagram (Figure 1), we shall discuss the diverse usage of the term “reason”, and the various considerations that have justified one or the other positions.
Figure 1
The above diagram indicates three different meanings in which the term “reason” has been used. These are as follows:
1. “Reason” has been used to represent the human intellectual faculty that processes a variety of information as premises to draw conclusions thereupon. The premises utilized by the human intellectual faculty and the conclusions drawn thereof can be identified with one or the other discipline of knowledge. Moreover, the human intellectual faculty is not merely considered a processor of information, but is also believed to harbor at least some a priori knowledge consisting of self-evident principles. In other words, it has been argued that a priori knowledge of self-evident principles (also known as the “first principles”) is built-in to human intellectual faculty unlike other sources of knowledge (such as revelation, observations, transmitted reports) that are basically external.
2. “Reason” has been used to represent the various types of premises (reasons) that are employed by human beings in their inferences. Each of the various kinds of premises represents a source of knowledge, which is characteristically associated with one or more disciplines of knowledge.
3. Finally, “reason” has been used to represent the exercise of intellectual faculty in the absence of revealed premises, observations and transmitted reports. Such exercise of human reason has been expressed in literature as “pure reason”, “independent use of reason”, “reason in the absence of revelation” etc. Here, I contend that reason (i.e. human intellectual faculty) cannot be exercised in a “pure” and “empty” state in the absence of revelation, observations, transmitted reports, or a priori knowledge (if that is recognized as a separate source of knowledge). What has been called “pure reason” actually employs “assumptions”; thus, the exercise of human intellectual faculty in the absence of revelation, observation and transmitted reports makes use of “conjecture” as the premise. It appears that such utilization of conjecture as the premise has not been very clearly identified in epistemological discourse. At least partly, this is because philosophical ideas founded on conjecture have often been packaged and presented as “logically necessary”—something that would necessarily follow from a priori knowledge. Of course, philosophers would rarely attribute their ideas to conjecture, for this would strip their ideas of any credibility. If we identify conjecture as the premise in the exercise of so-called “pure reason”, then it would become obvious that much of the criticism of “reason” is actually a rejection of “conjecture” and not of reason per se.
The varied use of the term “reason” is noticeable in the scholars’ arguments over the relationship between revelation and reason. Historically, the employment of “conjecture” by the mu‘tazilah and Muslim philosophers in their use of “reason” has invoked much criticism of reason and rationality in general. The mu‘tazilah and Muslim philosophers often went on to answer questions on which revelation was silent and observation was not available. Although the “logical deductive” discourse of the mu‘tazilah and philosophers was often based on assumptions and conjecture, their answers to subtle metaphysical questions were almost always portrayed as “self-evident truth” that necessarily followed from a priori knowledge. Such use of reason in the third sense of the word (as described earlier) understandably led their critics to argue for a priority of revelation over reason. Furthermore, most critics of the mu‘tazilah and philosophers, failing to isolate and criticize conjecture as the sole problem in the rationalist discourse, ended up criticizing reason in general. But at the same time, some of the critics of the rational discourse did not completely shun reason; instead they suggested a restricted meaning and role of reason as a tool that merely analyzes and infers—which essentially meant the use of reason in the first sense of the word (as described earlier). These latter critics also identified conjecture as the problem and articulated their criticism of it.
Repulsed by the mu‘tazilite rationalistic discourse, many of the later theologians and fuqahā’ often compromised on the rationality (i.e. reasonability) of Islamic beliefs and practices. The aversion to reason and rationality lasts until today. It is no wonder that contemporary scholars who attempt to restore the complementary relationship between revelation and reason are not welcomed. This is because the vast majority of Muslims does not realize that the rationality alluded to by the contemporary Muslim scholars is not the same as the mu‘tazilite rationalism. Conjecture and philosophy are rapidly losing ground even in the Western discourse, and the scope of a priori knowledge of self-evident principles is increasingly narrowed down to the effect that presumptive ideas cannot be conveniently presented as matters of logical necessity. When contemporary Muslim scholars argue for the complementarity of revelation and reason, they mean reason in the second sense of the word (described earlier); in particular, they seek to emphasize that human observation and authentic historical reports cannot possibly contradict revelation.
It is possible to articulate a Qur’ānic view on the various kinds of premises that constitute the sources of human knowledge. A deep examination of the Qur’ān indicates that revelation, observation, transmitted reports, and a priori knowledge are acceptable sources of knowledge, but conjecture and assumptions are unacceptable as a source of knowledge. Thus, the Qur’ān requires that religious belief be founded on al-kitāb, sultān mubīn, burhān etc., which implies that revelation is an acceptable, even necessary source of knowledge. Then the Qur’ān is also replete with āyāt that encourage the reader to “observe” the natural and physical phenomena that surround him; it is also repeatedly emphasized that an “observation” of nature would reveal to the observer the “signs” of the Creator, His Majesty, the Author of the Qur’ān. This implies the acceptability of observation as a source of human knowledge. Similarly, Qur’ān questions the reader on different occasions in more or less the same words: alam ya’tikum naba’u alladhīn kafarū min qabl (has the news of those who disbelieved before not reached you?),2 which implies the acceptability of transmitted reports as a source of knowledge. Finally, the Qur’ān also endorses the judging capacity of human reason (the human intellectual faculty). On the other hand, the unmistakable Qur’ānic rejection of zann, amāniy and iftirā’ ‘ala Allāh indicates the unacceptability of conjecture as a source of knowledge. With a fresh understanding of the sources of knowledge endorsed and rejected by the Qur’ān, it may be argued that authentic human knowledge—reason, in the second sense of the word—cannot possibly contradict revelation. In fact, the absolute necessity of the complementarity of revelation and reason could be argued on the grounds that observation of the physical and the historical phenomena is all that is available for mankind to ascertain the plausibility of the metaphysical propositions of revelation.
Conclusion
We have discussed the use of “reason” in various meanings and the implications of such varied usage of the term in the discussions of the relationship between revelation and reason. We may now conclude that revelation and reason are complementary sources of knowledge and that a real contradiction between the two is not possible. Should there be an apparent contradiction between revelation and reason, the reader should review his understanding of both to see if a subtle point has been missed; such practice is expected to resolve all apparent contradictions between revelation and reason.3 In terms of the unity of truth and the impossibility of a contradiction between revelation and reason, the two may be considered equally valid and complementary to each other. However, notwithstanding the complementarity of revelation and reason, an understanding of the rationale behind an injunction is not a precondition for compliance by a Muslim; once a person becomes a Muslim after having ascertained the truth of Islam for himself, he is expected to unconditionally submit to the will of Allah as proposed by Qur’ān and the authentic Sunnah of the Prophet salla Allahu ‘alayhi wa sallam. “It is not fitting for a Believer, man or woman, to exercise personal discretion after a matter has been decided by Allah and His Messenger.”4 In that sense, revelation reserves a priority over human reason. On the other hand, reason judges between the various religious truth-claims and enables man to embrace the one that is most plausible and therefore nearest to truth; in that judging capacity, reason reserves a higher place than revelation.
Confusion in how revelation and reason relate to each other has grappled the Muslims in the present age. A clear understanding of the relationship between revelation and reason—how and when one has a priority over the other, and in what sense the two are equal—is expected to facilitate the Muslims in moving beyond this fundamentally important theoretical dilemma to advancement in all fields of human knowledge and resolution of the more significant contemporary issues facing the Muslim world. (God knows best)
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1. Imām al-Ash‘arī rightly pointed
out that the Qur’ān argues with reason, for its first audience was not a
community of believers; of course, to begin with, the Qur’ān was to address
the disbelievers.
2. The Qur’ān, 64:5
3. Ismā‘īl R. al-Farūqī, al-Tawhīd – Its Implications for Thought and Life (Herndon: IIIT, n.d.), 43-44.
4. The Qur’ān, 33:36