The Qur’ān and the Sunnah and the Hadīth are interconnected. Internally, the Sunnah and the Ḥadīth are a body to the soul – the Qur’ān. Apparently, however, the Sunnah and the Hadīth provide details to the compact Qur’ān: their interrelation is that of detail and brevity. Both the Qur’ān and the Sunnah are equally important as far as the question of practicing the religion is concerned. We cannot separate the two. Following either is an obligation of equal degree.
The Qur’ān marks the limits and outlines of the picture of believers’ life pattern and specifies the boundaries. It leaves the task of colouring and complementing the pattern for the Prophet (sws): it is for the Sunnah to give concrete shape and provide practical form to the believers’ life. The Qur’ānic teachings are, therefore, confined to a comprehensive treatment of the principle teachings of Islam. We do not find the requisite details and specifics of any fundamental issue in the Book for which we have to refer to the Sunnah and the Hadīth.
The Prayer is the most important worship ritual in Islam. The place of the Prayer in the philosophical foundations of the religion can be gleaned from the Qur’ān. The basic components of this worship ritual as well as its relevance to human life too have been thoroughly discussed in the Book. However, we rely on the Sunnah and the Hadīth on the questions of the timings, the form, the recitations and the status (in terms of obligatory and optional) of the Prayer. The Qur’ān only refers to these things. It does not detail them.
Same is the case with the other worship rituals, social affairs, economic issues, political matters, and penal codes. We can form an overall picture of the sharī‘ah directives concerning these issues as they are mentioned in the Qur’ān. However, it is only the Sunnah that colours and completes the picture. This is not applicable to each and every directive of the Qur’ān. It would be hard to say that we need to turn to the Sunnah in an effort to understand all the directives contained in the Qur’ān. It is, nevertheless, clear that if any aspect of a directive requires further examination then the only helpful source is the Hadīth and the Sunnah.
Prophet (sws): the Divine Teacher of the Sharī‘ah
The Prophet (sws) did not carry out the task of filling out the outline of life as an additional voluntary service. It was his primary duty as the Messenger of God. His status as a teacher is one of the fundamental aspects of his position as a Messenger of God. This means that whatever he taught and told people is not excluded from his duty as the Messenger nor is it of lesser status than the Book. The Qur’ān clearly says that he was not a mere reciter or communicator of the Book of God; he was a teacher of the Book and its explicator:
It is He who sent to the unlettered people a messenger of their own who recites to them His verses, and purifies them, and teaches them the sharī‘ah and the wisdom; although before his advent they were in manifest error. (Q 62:2)
The Prophet (sws) not only explicated the verses containing the Divine directives but also explained the subtle points of ḥikmah (wisdom) buried within the Book of God. The following Hadīth refers to this very quality of the Prophet (sws): “I have been granted the Qur’ān and with it something similar to it.”1
The above discussions show that the Sunnah is equal to the Qur’ān for it enjoys historical reliability of an equal degree. If the Qur’ān has been orally transmitted through generality to generality (tawātur-i qawlī), the Sunnah too has been handed down, practically, through perpetual adherence of the ummah with consensus (tawātur-i ‘amalī). We cannot grade and set a preference for either and cannot characterize either with relegation or elevation. Both sources are equally important when it comes to the question of following the religion of Islam.
Genesis of the Extremist Positions on Authoritativeness of the Ḥadīth
The foregoing discussion shows the natural interrelation between the Qur’ān, the Hadīth and the Sunnah. However, during the early history of Islam, narrating Aḥādīth was an extremely popular activity. This popularity remained ever increasing. This made many insincere people narrate Aḥādīth without investigating the authenticity of the reports. This gave rise to a huge number of weak Aḥādīth. Consequently some believers felt disinclined to a ready acceptance of Aḥādīth. They publically expressed their views regarding the traditions. They would ask people to base their religious views on the Qur’ān only. Various historical narratives detail such discussions. I would, however, confine my discussion to one pertinent historical narrative. This will help us understand how and when extreme positions in this regard originated.
Ḥasan narrates that ‘Imrān ibn Ḥuṣayn was once sitting
among his Companions (rta). Someone said: “Do not talk of anything other than
the Qur’ān.” ‘Imrān ibn Ḥuṣayn asked [those present]: “Bring this man closer
to me.” The man came near him. ‘Imrān said to him: “Suppose you are left only
with the Qur’ān. Do you find any information in the Book that explains that the
ẓuhr and ‘asr Prayers consist of four rak‘āt, and maghrib of three and that you
need to recite the Qur’ān in the first two rak‘ah. Similarly, do you see
anything in the Qur’ān guiding us to circumambulate the Ka‘bah seven times along
with the circumambulation of the Ṣafā and Marwah [while offering ḥajj and ‘umrah]?”
Then he said: “People learn from us, lest you go astray.”2
Some other versions of this narrative are relatively
fuller detailing the incident further. According to these narratives ‘Imrān
presented, as examples, some legal punishments and asked his adversaries about
their details in the Qur’ān. At one end of the extreme, we see an aversion towards
aḥādīth. In reaction to this stance, there stands another group of scholars who
showed lack of interest in the Qur’ān. They advocated sticking to Aḥādīth in
the extreme. Some of these people openly declared that Aḥādīth had to be
preferred over the Qur’ān. Makḥūl, in one of his famous saying, tells us: “The
Qur’ān is more in need of the Sunnah (aḥwaj ’ilā al-sunnah) than the Sunnah is
of the Qur’ān.”3
This means that, according to Makḥūl, the Sunnah does not
depend on the Qur’ān more than the Qur’ān depends on it. This view gives obvious
preference to the Sunnah over the Qur’ān. It is obviously the worst form of
exaggeration. This view continued to grow till the point when statements like
the following were issued: It has been reported that Yaḥyā ibn Kathīr said:
“The Sunnah rules over the Qur’ān (qāḍiyah ‘alā al-kitāb) and the Qur’ān does
not rule over the Sunnah (qāḍiyan ‘alā al-sunnah).4
In other words, God forbid, the Prophet (sws) rules over
Allah and not the vice versa. One exaggeration no doubt leads to another severer
exaggeration; errors always spawn errors. In fact when aḥādīth became a dear commodity in the
market, people started presenting worthless statements as Prophetic sayings. A
group of scholars reacted to this situation and expressed their disapproval of
this practice. They found some zealot followers of their view who, in turn, did
not stop before reaching at even worse exaggerations. This phenomenon left us in
the state where the Qur’ān and the Sunnah became two opposing and mutually
contradicting sources. One wonders what is the use of the Sunnah in the absence
of the Qur’ān? What would be its foundations? We know that the Sunnah is
grounded in the Qur’ān. The edifice of the Sunnah cannot be erected in the
absence of the Qur’ān, its foundation. The truth of the matter is that both the
Sunnah and the Qur’ān are interrelated. The Sunnah is to the Qur’ān as the
building is to the foundation or as body is to soul. Another kind of
interrelation between the two is that of brevity (the Qur’ān) and detail (the
Sunnah). Both spring from the same source, are interdependent and equally
indispensable for the believers. Aḥādīth and the Sunnah cannot abrogate the Qur’ān God has mercifully continued raising people in the ummah
who have shown the right path to the believers guiding them out of the traps of
exaggerating squabblers. When this dispute over the interrelation of the Qur’ān
and the Hadīth arose, the Almighty blessed some individuals with the power to
protect and promote a balanced approach. The man who fulfilled this duty in a
most beautiful manner is Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, the greatest servant of the
discipline who excelled in the knowledge of the Prophetic traditions. When such
exaggerations regarding the status of the Sunnah, in relation to the Qur’ān,
were brought to his notice, he explained the correct view. Faḍl ibn Ziyād
reports: I heard Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal respond to a question about the
Hadīth5
which says that the Sunnah overrules the Qur’ān in the following words: “I dare
not say so. However, the Sunnah explicates the Book, defines and explains it.”6
Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal believes that the Sunnah explicates,
explains and defines the Qur’ān. A Hadīth or a Sunnah can never abrogate the
Qur’ān. To him, the importance of the Sunnah and the Hadīth is recognized. It
cannot be denied by a believer. However, the claim that they overrule the Qur’ān
is absolutely baseless. As for Aḥādīth, they lack soundness in so many ways that
they cannot abrogate a conclusive source such as the Qur’ān. The belief that
they can abrogate the Qur’ān is absolutely against reason and intellect. I have
referred to the inherent weakness involved in the transmission of Aḥādīth in
our discussion on the difference between the Hadīth and the Sunnah. This
discussion suffices as a referent and repetition would be redundant. The Sunnah, though not weak in those aspects, too cannot
abrogate the Qur’ān. The Messenger of God was never allowed even to introduce
the slightest change in the Qur’ānic text. We learn from the history of the
Prophetic struggle that the Quraysh refused to accept and believe in the Qur’ān
until the Prophet (sws) altered it for them. The Prophet (sws) was commanded by
God to respond to this demand in the following words: Tell them it is not my right to change it on my own
accord. (10:15) The Qur’ān is the word of God. None other than the author
can change and alter it. There are, no doubt, instances of abrogation in the
Book. However, all the changes made in the directives of the Book were
introduced by the Author Himself. Both the abrogating and the abrogated verses
are part of the Qur’ān. The Messenger was obliged by God to perfectly
communicate to the people what was given to him, without altering it. He was
obligated to explain to the believers whatever part required an explanation. He
could not make the slightest change possible in it. He had no right to change
it. If the Messenger is not given the right to alter the word of God, how can we
validly give a Hadīth ascribed to him or a Sunnah attributed to him the right to
abrogate the Book. Can a Sunnah or a Ḥadīth specify a General Command of the
Book? Can a Hadīth or a Sunnah specify and restrict the
application of a Qur’ānic verse or not, is another question. By specification (takhṣīṣ),
we mean restricting application of a general command (muṭlaq) of the Book of
God in any degree. This question calls for a detailed answer which follows: i. The specifications affected by Aḥādīth can be of many
degrees and kinds. A Hadīth, in some cases, specifies the application of a
general command of the Qur’ān, excluding its application to a matter which the
text itself excludes, though subtly. In such cases, therefore, ignoring the
subtle indications and including the unintended matter in the application would
not be in accord with the principles of interpretation. It would entail negation
of the implied meaning and intent of the text. Thus this type of specification
is not only possible but desirable. Not only a Hadīth and a Sunnah but also
independent reasoning and analogy can be used to specify the general application
of the verses in such cases. ii. If, however, a Hadīth restricts the application of the
Qur’ānic directive and excludes the intended meaning, noticeably implied in the
text, this specification would in fact be a new directive replacing the original
one. Adopting such a Hadīth then would mean that we consider the new directive
to be more forceful than the clear Qur’ānic injunction. It would not be an
instance of simple specification. It would be a clear example of abrogation. We
have already observed that it is not possible for even the Messenger of God to
cancel the directives of the Qur’ān. This right then cannot be given to the
Aḥādīth ascribed to him. I intend to further illustrate this point with the help of
an example. The Qur’ān commands that the hands of a thief be cut off. The
Prophet (sws) said that if someone steals a thing worth less than a quarter of a
dīnār, then his hands should not be cut. This exemplifies the first type of
specification mentioned above. We see this Hadīth affects the application of the
verse commanding cutting off hands of the thief. The narrative states that only
such thieves may be punished by cutting their hands who steal more than a
quarter of a dīnār. The related Qur’ānic directive follows: Cut the hands of the thief – man (al-sāriq) or woman (al-sāriqah)
– in recompense to what they earned and as an exemplary punishment from God.
(5:38) The narrative that restricts its application to a certain
type of thieves follows: The hands of the thief may only be cut if he has stolen
something worth at least a quarter of a dīnār. (Abū Dāwūd, No: 4384) The verse gives a general command. It requires cutting the
hands of the thief (sāriq). The Hadīth does not allow us to apply the directive
to thieves in general. It states that a thief may only be punished if he steals
things worth at least equal to a quarter of a dīnār. This specification is,
indeed, an explanation of the correct and intended meaning of the word al-sāriq
(thief). The word al-sāriq is not applied to the one who picks up insignificant
items. Sarqah (theft), according to the conventions of the Arabic language, is
applied to stealing a secured and guarded asset of considerable value. This
Hadīth offers a valid explanation of the original meaning of the word. This
specification makes the true intention of the author clear and fixes and defines
it. It removes the possibility of apparent ambiguity in the words of the verse.
This is the true example of takhṣīṣ (specification). ‘Umar (rta), the second caliph, specified the application
of this general command. He exercised personal reasoning and analogy and
suspended the application of the directive during the period of drought. He
argued that, in such a situation, one might be compelled to commit theft out of
irresistible want. This supports my understanding of the issue. I have held
earlier that such a specification can be exercised by any mujtahid (jurist).
This kind of specification will be equal to only a directive reached at through
ijtihād. However, it must remain clear that the ijtihād reached by one of the
Rightly Guided Caliphs holds great importance in the religion. The truth of the matter is that every general statement
contains natural restrictions and specifications which are there ab initio. Take
for example the verse of inheritance. The Almighty says: Allah enjoins you concerning your children that the male
shall have the equal of the portion of two females; if there are more than two
females, they shall have two-thirds of what the deceased has left, and if there
is one, she shall have the half; and as for his parents, each of them shall have
the sixth of what he has left if he has a child, but if he has no child and
(only) his two parents inherit him, then his mother shall have the third; but if
he has brothers and sisters, then his mother shall have the sixth after the
payment of a bequest he may have bequeathed or a debt. You do not know which of
your parents and your children is nearer to you in usefulness. This is an
ordinance from Allah: Surely Allah is Knowing, Wise. (4:11) The general nature of the verse demands that every father
inherits property from his sons and every son inherits property from his father.
However, there is a general specification implied in it. Thus, the difference in
the religion of the deceased father/son or the heir son/father would remove the
general nature of the directive. The difference in religious affiliation of the
heir and the deceased obstructs the transfer of property as inheritance to the
heir. The Prophet (sws) has expressed this specification in the following words: A believer shall not inherit from a disbeliever; nor shall
a disbeliever from a believer.”7
General application of the Divine command regarding the
punishment of cutting off hands of the thief is of the same nature. The relevant
Qur’ānic verse apparently commands that the hands of every thief shall be cut
off. It does not clearly require that the age and social and mental status of
the accused and nature of the theft etc. are to be considered, while
implementing the command. Yet, however, the implicit specification in this
command of general nature is that the thief who is to get this punishment must
be a mature man of sound mental health. Mentally ill persons, for example,
cannot be punished. If someone is compelled by sheer need for necessities of
life and commits theft, he cannot be punished. Similarly, the value of stolen
things should also be assessed. Only the theft of a significant item should be
punished. All these are taken as ab initio qualifications. The jurists (fuqahā)
and the Prophetic traditions only make them more explicit for us. Another example of specification, rather of abrogation,
relates to the punishment of adulterers mentioned in the Qur’ānic verse (Q 24:2)
commonly referred to as the verse of flogging. Many scholars, based on some
aḥādīth, restrict the application of the prescribed punishment to the unmarried
offenders. The case of the married adulterers, it is held, has been stipulated
in a different and severer punishment8
independent of this Qur’ānic injunction. The wording of the verse, however, does
not contain a slightest clue to this discrimination between the married and the
unmarried criminals. The verse reads: Al-zānī and al-zāniyah, flog each one of them with a
hundred stripes. (24:2) The words al-zānī and al-zāniyah do not admit of any
qualification. We cannot, therefore, exclude married criminals from the
injunction while remaining true to the words of the verse. The verse clearly
includes both married as well as unmarried zānīs. In the Arabic language, zinā
is applied to the sexual intercourse committed out of wedlock by married as well
as unmarried persons. The necessary elements of the definition of the word zinā
apply both to the married and unmarried offenders. Besides, there is no inherent
qualification found in this context as is the case with the definition and
application of the word sarqah (theft) discussed above. There is no textual
indication attached with the directive restricting the application of the
command to unmarried people only. Therefore, we cannot say that married people
have to be given a separate punishment, of stoning to death. This is not an
instance of specification. It is rather a clear and explicit example of
abrogation. We have already seen that no Sunnah or Hadīth can abrogate the
Qur’ān. If we try to understand the genesis of this
misinterpretation and study the issue in the Hadīth literature, we learn that
the Prophet (sws) extensively scrutinized the case of zinā involving Mā’iz
Aslamī. He sought minute and specific details and asked very specific questions
regarding the act. He was so direct that the jurists, based on this careful
scrutiny and vigorous investigation by the Prophet (sws), could conclude that a
judge may use naked, direct and immodest expressions while questioning the
accused. I believe that this extensive questioning was done to remove the
possibility of using the term in its general sense. It helps a judge to
determine that the accused has really committed sexual intercourse, something
that merits the prescribed punishment. This scrutiny and investigation into the
nature of the act was not carried out to determine the marital status of the
offender. The jurists commonly hold that in the case of a valid
instance of abrogation, the abrogator and the abrogated verses occur in
succession, i.e., both the injunctions are not casually scattered in the
Scripture. This serves to explain that the textual evidences, indicating that a
directive is abrogated by a succeeding one, are put beside the abrogated
command. They co-occur with the command from its inception. If something is
purported to be an abrogator, without the support of such clear co-occurring
indicators, then that is not an instance of specification but of abrogation. The
conditions to be fulfilled in a valid instance of abrogation in the Qur’ān have
been sufficiently explained in the foregoing pages. (Translated from Mabādī Tadabbur-i Hadīth by Tariq Mahmood Hashmi)
_________________________
1. Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī Abū Bakr al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Al-Kifāyah fī ‘ilm al-riwāyah, (Hayderabad Deccan: Dā’irah al-ma‘ārif al-‘uthmāniyah, 1938), 8.
2. Ibid., 15.
3. Ibid., 14.
4. Ibid.
5. This can at best refer to the statement ascribed to Yạhyā ibn Kathīr. There is no such Hadīth which may be directly traced back to the Prophet (sws). (Author)
6. Al-Khaṭīb Al-Baghdādī, Al-Kifāyah fī ‘ilm al-riwāyah, 15.
7. Ibid., 13.
8. It is held that only the married zānīs have to be stoned to death.